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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of lhe
STATE or UTAH
CASE NO. 9278
GEORGE 0. PATTE·RSON and EDNA PATTERSON, his
wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

- vsMAX WILCOX and ROBERTA WILCOX, husband and
wife and BEN D. BRQWNING and MARJORIE
BROWNING, husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants
BRIEF OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS
G. 0. PATTERSO,N AND EDNA PATTERSO·N

PREFATORY STATEMENT
After hearing the evidence presented, the Trial Court
ruled that the three-year statute of limitations set forth
in the Utah Code was a bar to Respondents' claim of fraud
leaving the only remaining issue before the Court, as stated
by the Trial Judge, as follows: - (Page 55 of Reporter's
Transcript) .
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"THE COURT: I think, as you say, you have covered
it. I can read these cases and they probably will settle
it. There are some things I can decide easily. I can
decide easily the question of the Statute of Limitations here as I have, and there is no doubt in my mind
but what this is a grant of at least the uranium ores
there because I can't understand the presence of thi~s
description in the Deed unless it did. I can see that
the only thing in my mind now is whether it was intended to convey something more than the uranium,
and I think counsel pretty well exhausted what their
views are, and I think that I understand you perfectly
on it. So I will give my decision from the bench here
tomorrow morning, gentlemen. Court is in Recess."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The "Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" which are
the written documents in issue in this case were prepared
the same night as a part of the same transaction by the
Appellant Ben D. Browning and are set forth in words
and figures, to wit:
AGREEMENT

This agreement made and entered into this 28th day of April,
1955, by and between George 0. Patterson of Moab, Utah, and Max
C. Wilcox, of Moab, Utah,
WITNESSETII:

For and in consirlcration of the sum of Ten Thousand and no/100
Dollars ($10,000.00), I, George 0. Patterson do hereby quit claim
to Max C. Wilcox, all of my right, title and interest in and to the
following described r(lal property:
30 Mining claims, designated lower Valley, Nos. 1 through 30
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3
all located in R 20 E. 31 S. Salt Lake Meridian, as further
shown by tPe offieial records of the San Juan County Recorder.
Reserviug nevertheless, surface rights to the said Geo. 0. Patterson. And, all rnineral rights to the following named parcels
of land, to wit:
"SE 14 NE 14 ; NE 14 SE 14 ; SE lf4 SE 14; Section 8, and NW~;
NWIA,SWIA, Section 9 Township 31 South, Range 26 East, Salt
Lake Meridian" Commonly known as the W.H. Coefield property.
And, "The East % of the Northeast Quarter of Section Seventeen in Township 31 South, Range 26 East, Salt Lake Meridian."
Containing 80 acres.
Together with an eaf'ement of way to the grantee or his assigns
to. the above. described parce~s of property_ for the purpose of mining
sa.~.d properties and conducting all oprations incidental thereto including but not limited to exploration, development and surveying.
Grantors further reserve the right to impose and obligation
upon these properties to the extent of ten per cent of all minerals
reserved by this deed as determined by gross mill receipts less haulage allo\vance and penalties for high lime content; said ore payment
to terminate when such payments shall be paid in the sum of
$5,000,000.00.
The said Max C. Wilcox, or his assigns, does hereby agree to
perform the necessary assessment work on the above described real
property, yearly, said assessment work to commence and be completed on or before th£ 1st day of July, 1955, and thereafter on or
betore the 1st day of June, each and every year thereafter. In
the event the said assessment work is not performed at the times
specified, said mining claims shall revert to said George 0. Patterson.
The said $10,000.00 is to be paid at the following rate and in
the following manner: $5,000.00 in cash, and $5,000.00 in stock in
a corporation be formed, said stock to be issued at par value. And
in the event that said corporation is not formed with 90 days from
the date hereof, then the said Max C. Wilcox agrees to pay the
said $5,000.00 to the said George 0. Patterson in cash.
Witness the signature of the parties hereto the day and year
filst above written.

Is/ George 0. Patterson
/s/

Max C. Wilcox
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Recorded at Request of ---------------------------------------at ------· ~- Fee Paid $ -------------------------------------by-----------·----------- Dep. Book ______ Page ______ Ref. -----~ail tax notice to ------------------ Address -----------------QUIT CLAIM DEED

GEORGE 0. PATTERSON and EDNA L. PATTERSON, his wife,
grantors, of ~oab, County of Grand, State of Utah, hereby QUITCLAIM to MAX C. wn..cox of Moab, Grand County, State of Utah,
grantee, for the sum of Ten and no/100 -------- DOLLARS, the following described tract of land in San Juan County, State of Utah:
30 ~ining claims, designated Lower Valley, Nos. 1 through 30
all located in R 26 E,31 S, Salt Lake Meridian, as further shown
by the official records of the San Juan County Recorder. Reserving, nevertheless, surface rights to the grantors, and all mineral rights to the following named parcels of land, to wit:
"SE~NE~; NE~SE~; SE:IA,SElJ4; Section 8, and NW~;
NW:JA,SW:JA, Section 9 Township 31 South, Range 26 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian" Commonly known as theW.
H. Coefield property, And,
"The East % of the Northeast Quarter of Section Seventeen
in Township 31 South, Range 26 East, Salt Lake Meridian."
Containing 80 acres.
Together with an easement of way to the grantee or his assigns
to the above described parcels of property for the purpose
of mining said properties and conducting all operations incidental thereto including but not limited to exploration, development
and surveying.
Grantors further reserve the right and impose an obligation
upon these properties to the extent of ten per cent of all minerals
reserved by this deed as determined by gross mill receipts less
haulage allowance and penal ties for high lime contents; said ore
payment to terminate when such payments shall be paid in the
sum of $5,000,000.00.
Witness the hand of said grantor, this 28th day of April, A. D, one
thousand nine hundred and fifty five.
Signed in the presence of
• /s/ GEORGE 0. PATTERSON
/s/ BEN D. BROWNING
/s/ EDNA L. PATTERSON

t

STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss.
County of
)
On the
day of
A.D. one thousand nine
hundred and
personally appeared before me
the signer of the foregoing instrumnt, who duly acknowledge to me
that he executed the same.
My commission expires
Address:
Notary Public.
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~3,

The Appellants in the Statement of Facts in Paragraph
Page 2 of their brief, ~state that the Plaintiffs "directed

their attack toward the circumstances surrounding the consideration for the Deed rather than the intention of the
parties or the provisions of the Deed."
'fhe Respondents do not feel that this is an accurate
statement of the facts and calls the Court's attention to
the fact that the Court admitted testimony of the Plaintiff and Respondent George 0'. Patterson and the Defendant and Appellant, Max Wilcox, concerning the negotiations leading up to the signing of the "Agreement" and the
signing of the "Quit Claim Deed" both dated July 28, 1955,
and hereinafter for convenience referred to as the "Agreement" and as the "Quit Claim Deed". All of said testimony
clearly shows the intention of the parties was to deal in
uranium and vanadium. Respondents rely on the entire
transcript and particularly the statements in said transcript describing the negotiations leading up to the signing of the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" and call
the Court's attention to the repeated reference and discussions concerning uranium and the conspicuous, absence of any mention of any other mineral or minerals.
Reporter's
Reporter's
Reporter's
Reporter's
Reporter's

Transcript,
Transcript,
Transcript,
Transcript,
Transcript,

page
page
page
page
page

13, lines 1 through 19
14, lines 12 through 30
15, lines 1 through 30
16, lines: 1 through 30
17, lines 1 through 30

The Respondents feel that it is also significant and
important to state the following: -
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1.. The Defendant Ben D. Browning claims to own
an undivided fifty per cent interest in the fee simple mineral estate in the patented land referred to and described
in the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim D~eed" (Reporter's
TrarJscript, page 8, lines 6 through 20).

2. The said Ben D. Browning dictated, in the middle
of the night of April 28, 1955, the "Agreement" and "Quit
Clahn Deed" to Edward M. Garrett, Appellant's attorney
in this lawsuit, who in turn reduced the same to writing
in the form set forth above. (See Reporter's Transcript,
page 40, lines 7 through 13, and page 16, lines 8 and 9,
and page 17, lines 13 through 30.)
3. That at the time of the negotiations between the
Appellants and Respondents and at the time the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" were dictated by Mr. Ben
D. Browning to Mr. Edward M. Garrett as aforesaid, Mr.
Browning was acting not only as attorney for the Appellant, Max Wilcox, but was also seeking to acquire property
interest for himself. (See 'Reporter's Transcript, page 29,
lines 20 through 22).
In addition to the facts above presented which Respondents feel were not fully set forth in the Appellants
brief, the Respondents call the Court's attention to the
following facts which appear in the record:1. That on October 1, 1958, three years and two months
after the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" were prepared by Ben D. Browning, the Defendant, Max Wilcox,
entered into a Grazing Lease, a copy of which was and is
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attached to Plaintiffs' Complaint, marked "Exhibit A"
and by reference made a part thereof, which Grazing
Lease provided, in part, as follows: "4. It is further understood and agreed that this Lease
does not include any mineral rig.hts whatesoever and
the Lessors specifically reserve the right to occupy
so much of the surface of the demised premises as
may be necessary or convenient for any mining operation conducted by Lessors or those acting by their
authority and that no compensation will be paid to
Lessee for such right."
"It is further agreed between the parties that the
Lessee upon paying the rent and performing all of
the covenants and agreements herein set forth to be
performed by said Lessee, shall at th'e expiration of
this Lease on September 30, 1968, have the right to
purchase the surface rights only to the real property
above described together. with the Taylor Grazing Permits and State Leases herein referred to at a price to
be determined between the parties."
Paragraph 9 of the Appellants' Amended Complaint
reads as follows : "D. That on the first day of October, 1958, the Plain-

tiff's, G. 0. Patterson and Edna L. Patterson, husband
and wife, entered into a Grazing Lease with the Defendant, Max C. Wilcox, a copy of which said Lease is
attached hereto marked "Exhibit A" and by reference
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made a part hereof that sa.id Lease is a valid and existing Lease and is recognized as such by the Plaintiffs."
In Paragraph 7 of the Defendants' Ansrwer and Counterc1aim to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint they answer
as follows : "Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 9 of
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint."
On pages 5 and 6 Reporter's Transcript, the following
statement was made to the Court in an effort to define
the matters that would require proof and to eliminate
those that would not require proof, and Mr. Edward M.
Garrett, Attorney for the Appellants, at that time again
recognized the Grazing Lease including the references to
minerals as a valid and subsisting lease : "MR. RUGGERI: Now in Paragraph 9 of the Complaint, the Defendants admit that G. 0. Patterson and
Edna Patterson entered into a grazing lease with Max
\Vilcox and a copy of the lease is attached to it as
''Exhibit A" and by reference made a part thereof,
and a valid and existing lease and is recognized as
such by the Plaintiffs. There was an argument or discussion that came up, Your Honor, about this particular matter and Mr. Patterson entered into a grazing
lease with the Defendant Max Wilcox and in so far as
that affects the, his right in that property we recognige that ~as being a valid subsisting lease and appar-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
eutly they do too. That's right, isn't it?"
"MR. GARRETT: That's correct."
2. That App€llant Max Wilcox and Respondent George
0. Patterson had a convers ation a.bout the properties after
the signing of the "Agreement'' and "Quit Claim Deed"
and discussed uranium and vanadium only. (Reporter's
Transcript, page 18, lines 16 through 23).
1

3. The Appellants abandoned the unpatented lode mining claims referred to in the "Agreement" and "Quit
Claim Deed" aft€r doing assessment work for the ass·essment year ending July 1, 1955 only. (Reporter's Transcript, page 37, lines 21 through 30, and page 38, line 1,
and page 36, lines 26 through 29).
4. The Appellants never bothered to record the "Agreement" or "Quit Claim Deed". (See Exhibits in the file.)
5. The Appellants never bothered to place any documentary stamps on said Quit Claim Deed or to have sajd
''Quit Cl~im Deed" acknowledged so that it could be recorded despite the passage of almost five years from the
date of its execution to the date of the commencement of
this action. (See Exhibits in the file.)
6. The Defendant, 1\tlax Wilcox, who is the sole and
only Grantee named in the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim
Deed" did not ever convey a fifty per cent interest or any
interest at all in said property to Mr. Ben D. Browning
until l\1arch 20, 1960, the day before the trial in this case.
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(Reporter's Transcript, page 36, lines 6 through 19.)
The following matters are of common knowledge,
general geographical knowledge a.nd common historical
knowledge of which Trial Court and Appellate Court may
take judicial notice:1. That all of the lands involved herein are located
in Lisbon Valley, San Juan County, State of Utah.
2. That on April 28, 1955, there was a uranium mining boom on in San Juan County, Utah, and that large deposits of uranium and fissionable source materials had
been discovered in Lisbon Valley, San Juan County, Utah.
3. That many corporations were being formed by persons eager to make their uranium fortunes.
4. That no oil of commercial value nor any commercial
gas source had been discovered in Lisbon Valley at that

timt!.
5. It is equally well known and a matter of common
knowledge in the area of the transactions under consideration that "haulag'e allowance and penalties for high-lime
content" apply particularly to the practices and milling
processes rela.tive to the mining and refining of uranium
and related ores and have no relation to the recovery of
oil and gas.
All dark print herein is supplied for emphasis by
the Respondents.
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STATEMENT 0'F POINTS
POINT ONE
The findin~s of the Trial Court are fully
supported by evidence properly introduced into
and in a suit of this kind, the Supreme Court
disturb the T,rial Court's Findings of Fact,
find1ngs are clearly against the preponderance
dence.

and amply
the record
should not
unless the
of the evi-

POINT TWO
In construing the "Contract" and "Quit Claim Deed"
the interpretation of the Court must be on the entire instrument and not merely on disjointed or particular parts
of it in the light of circumstances surrounding the parties
to the instrument at the time of execution.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Findings of Fact made by the Trial Court are
fully and amply supported by evidence properly introduced
into record and in a. suit of this kind the Supreme Court
should not disturb the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, unless
the findings are clearly against the preponderance of evidence.

RIESKE v. HOOVER et al, 53 Utah 87, 177 P 228,
the Supreme Court of Utah said in determining the title
to certain land:
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"(1, 2) Unless the findings of the court are against
the clear preponderance of the evidence, we have no
power to reverse the judgment. That is the rule, even
if it be admitted that this, is an equity case, which
we do not deem it necessary to determine. If it is a
case at law, as cases in ejectment usually are, unless
an equitable defense is interposed, then the rule is
less liberal. In such case, if there is any substantial
evidence to support the findings, whether by a court
or a jury, we are powerless to interfere. These rules
are so well established in this jurisdiction as to become
a matter of common knowledge among the members
of the bar and courts of the state.

"(3) Under either rule above referred to we are of
the opinion that neither of the exceptions relied on
by appellants should prevail. Applying the rule most
favorable to appellants we are not prepared to hold
that the findings are against a clear preponderance
of the evidence. This is manifest upon a mere casual
reading of testimony, the substance and effect of
which we have endeavored to correctly state. It is not
necessary to comment on the evidence. It speaks for
itself. It is to some extent conflicting upon the main
issue. It therefore became the duty of the Trial Court
to reconcile the conflict, if possible, and determine the
facts. The findings' of the Trial Court being unimpeachable under the errors assigned, the duty of this
court is plain and unequivocal, unless, the law is contrary to our conception.
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STANLEY v. STANLEY, 97 Utah 520 94 2d 465:
"(1) The scope of the review on appeal in equity cases
is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. "This court is
authorized by the State Constitution to review the
findings of the trial courts on conflicting evidence will
not be set aside unless it manifestly appears that the
court has misapplied proven facts or made findings
clearly against the weight of the evidence." Olivero
v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P 313, 315.
"To the s.ame effect are Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah
45, 57 P 712; Singleton v. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 P
63, 66; Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P 457;
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P 2d 513, 101 A.L.R.
532; Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 P 2d; Hoyt
v. Upper Marion Ditch Co., 94 Utah 134, 76 P 2d 234."
PENN STAR MINING CO. v. LYMAN et all, ·64 Utah
343, 231 p 107:
"(7, 8) Lest we be misunderstood, we desire to add
in this connection that we are not passing upon
nor indicating what effect, if any, the trial court
should give to this evidence offered on behalf of Lyman. That is a question which primarily is within the
exclusive province of the trial court, or, in case there
is a dispute or conflict respecting the facts, for the
jury to determine. But, even though the facts are in
dispute and are submitted to the jury when they are
found, the court must nevertheless determine the legal
effect on the contract."
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POINT II
In construing the "Contract" and "Quit Claim Deed"
the interpretation of the Court must be on the entire instrum~ent and not merely on disjointed or particular parts
of it, in the light of all the circumstances surrounding
the parties to the instruments at the time of its execution.
The Appellants take the position that the Trial Court
cvuld only reach the conclusions it came to by considering
two matters only. They state on Page 10 of their brief,
as follows : "The record discloses only two possible sources for
such a conclusion, one of them being the Grazing
Lease entered into by the Respondents Patterson and
Wilcox more than three years after the delivery of
the Deed; the second being, the royalty reservation
contajned in the Deed."
The Respondents can sympathetically unders~tand how
the Appellants would like for their unsupported statement
to hold, but Respondents, submit as a matter of fact that
the record literally abounds with compelling evidence showing the intention of the parties was to deal for uranium and
related hardrock minerals only while it is conspicuously
silent with respect to any other minerals; the record shows
tha.t the Appellants themselves wrote the ambiguous
"Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" which under the circumstances must be construed most strongly against them
especially where the author is an attorney. In addition to
the foregoing, and again contrary to the desires of the Ap-
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pcllan ts, the Trial Court and the Supreme Court has the
right to take judicial notice of all matters of common
knowledge. With above matters in mind, the Respondents
respectfully submit that the following fundamental matters '\Nere properly considered by the Court in arriving at
its conclus.ions and that the Court was not limited in the
manner stated by the Appellants.
a. The interpretation of the "Agreement" and "Quit
Claim Deed" read in its entirety including "the reservaton of royalty" mentioned by Appellants.
b. The circumstances existing at the time of the execution of the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" as
shown by extrinsic evidence properly admitted into
the record by the Trial Court.
c. The construction to be placed
on an ambiguous in.. ,
strument when it was written by an attorney acting for himself as· an attorney for the Appellant,
Max Wilcox, in its preparation.
d. The practical interpretation placed upon the instrulnents by the parties themselves prior to the trial and
indeed as late as the morning of the trial. (Referred
to by Appellants as "Grazing Lease").
e. l\iatters of which the Court could take judicial
notice.
The Respondents will now proceed to discuss the following fundamental rules to the subjects they submit were
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properly considered by the Trial Court in its determination
of the intent of the parties~ in the order set forth above..
(a) In construing the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim
Deed" the court was obliged to construe the entire instrument.
The Appellants apparently subscribe to this proposition as they state on Page 16 of their brief as follows:"The rule followed in this State is that the whole
Deed will be considered and effect given to all its
terms. Coltharp v. Coltharp, 160 Pac 121. (Utah, Wood
vs. Ashby, 253, Pac 2d 351 (Utah), Haynes v. Hunt,
85 Pac 2d 861 (Utah)".
Respondents also rely upon the three cases cited by
Appellants and feel that it is appropriate at this time to
quote portions of said cases· in greater detail than the Appellants did in their brief.
COLTHA'RP v. COLTHARP 148 Utah 389, 160 P 121,
quoting from pa.ge 123: "While it is quite true that every word, and of course,
every phrase must be given its ordinary and usual
meaning and effect, yet, where unnecessary words a.re
used in a grant and it is clear that they were not intended by the Grantor as limitations upon the grant,
but rather as conferring a power which existed by implication of la.w, courts may not cut down the grant
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merely because useless words are incorporated in the
instrument. Morover, where words or phrases found in
different parts of a writing w.hich are repugnant the
courts must if possible, construe the whole instrument
so all of its parts may be given sure meaning and
effect, whether primary or secondary."
Applying the rule of law to the facts, in this case it
seems quite apparent that the Trial Court was doing no
more than reconciling repugnant parts of the ambiguous
"Contract'' and ambiguous "Quit Claim Deed" which the
Appellants themselves had prepared and for which ambiguity they must be held solely responsible. Indeed the
Quit Claim Deed is susceptible of an interpretation that
no mineral rights of any kind whatsoever were conveyed
to the Grantee where the Dead reads, as follows: "Reserving nevertheless, surface rights to the Grantors. And all mineral rights to the following named parcels of land, to-wit:"
(Description of the land in which Appellants now contend they own all mineral rights)
It is submitted that if the Court were to place a literal
interpretation on the wording of the Deed, as the Appellants would like to have it do when it works to their advantage, that the Court could only find no minerals of any
kind whatsoever were conveyed by such a grant as that
quoted above.
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HAYNES v. HUNT et al, 96 Uta.h, 348 84 P, quoting
from page 863 : "A more modern rule and that now followed by the
greater number of the courts is that the whole deed
and every part thereof is to be taken into consideration in determining the intention of the Grantor, and
clauses in the Deed subsequent to the granting clause
are given effect so as to curtail, limit, or qualify the
estate conveyed in the granting claus·e."
It seems apparent that the Trial Court was only following the rule stated above when- it considered that the
references made by the Appellants in preparing the Deed
to "gross mill receipts," and "high-lime contents" and
"haulage allowance" as curtailing, limiting and qualifying
the general term found in the granting clause of of the
"Quit Cla.im Deed" in question.
In this connection the Court properly took judicial
notice of the matter of common knowledge that "haulage
allowance" and "penalty for high-lime" apply particularly
to the practices and processes relative to the mining and
refining of uranium ores and have no relation whatsoever
to the recovery of oil and gas.
WO·OD v. ASHBY, 122 Utah 580 253 P 2d 351, quoting from Page 353.
"It is also established in this State that a. deed should
be construed ·So as to effectuate the intentions and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
desires of the parties, as manifested by the language
made use of in the deed."
The Appellants in their brief also apparently rely
heavily upon the case "Western Development Company v.
Nell, 4 Utah, 2d 112, 288 P 2d 452 upon which the Responden ts also rely and in so doing quote from said case
on Pages 453 and 454, a.s follows1: (1, 2) Although no similar case has arisen in the State
of Utah, the problem of the interpretation of a. deed,
usually an old one, where "mineral~s" or "mineral
rights" have been reserved and oil and gas have subsequently been discovered on the land is one which
has been frequently treated in other jurisdictions.
Were the only question involved the construction of
the first paragraphs of both the reservation and the
grant in the instant case, we would have no hesitation
in endorsing and applying the majority rule that a
reservation of "minerals" retains the rights to gas
and oil, unless a contrary intention is manifested, See 86
A.L.R. 986 and Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County 33 Utah 114, 83 P. 53 14 L. R.A., N.S., 1043 holding
that the expression "mineral1s" is not confined in
meaning to metals. However, as counsel for Appellants suggests in his excellent brief, cases construing
minerals as including oil and gas are not necessarily
opposed to those reaching an opposite result as regards
the particular instrument under the construction, since
the intention of the parties controls in the interpretation, 16 Am. Jr. 527, and where the intention of the
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parties can be a1scertained from the instrument, arbitrary rules of law as to construction will not be invoked, Haynes, v. Hunt, 96 Utah 348, 85 P. 2d 861.
"(3) One line of cases views descriptions of rights to
be exercised in the removal of the sub-surface values
as restricting the grant whereas the other line of cases
interprets such rights as enlarging or adding to the
grant. With such confusion in the authorities and because logic compels us to recognize as valid either interpretation, we hold that the deeds are ambiguous,
thus allowing the consideration of extrinsic evidence
as to the situation of the parties at the time of execution, the circumstances surrounding the transactions,
and the intent of the parties. See Hudson & Collins v.
McGuire, 188 Ky. 712 223 S.W. 1101, 17 A.L.R. 148.

"(4) The trial court admitted the extrinsic evidence
offered by Appellants, but determined the issue of
intent against then1. The burden of persuasion remained with the parties who asserted that the grantor in both deeds here under consideration intended
to convey less than the estate attributed by law to the
word "minerals" and hence, we must examine that
evidence to determine whether or not it is of such
substance as to compel a finding that oil and gas rights
were not intended to be included in the res·ervation
and grant."
The court in the Western Development case recognized that cases construing- minerals as including oil and gas
are not necessarily opposed to those reaching an opposite
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result as regards the particular instrument under construction since the intent of the parties controls and it is to be
noted that in the instant case the trial court like the trial
court in the Western Development case admitted the extrinsic evidence offered by the Respondents but unlike the
Western Development case determined the issue of intent
against the Appellants and in favor of the Respondents
and as stated under the authorities cited under Point No.
One the finding should not be lightly ove:"'ruled but should
be sustained whenever possible.
A prima facie meaning of the words "all 1ninerals"
must also yield to the intention considering the facts and
circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the instrument was made. Coltharp v. Coltharp, 48 Utah 389,
160 Pac. 121. Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah 580 253 P 2d 351.
Western Development Corporation v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112,
288 P 2d 452. See Annotation, L.R.A. 1918A 491, which
states that cases construing "minerals"· as including oil and
gas are not necessarily opposed to those reaching an opposite result as regards the particular instrument under
construction, and that the words ''minerals, mines and
mining rights" do not have an absolute definition when
used in legal documents, it being necessary to ascertain
the intention of the parties to the instrument in which the
term is used. Pridle v. Baker, 116 W. Va. 48, 178 S.E. 513,
514, Winsett v. Watson (Tex.) 206 S.W. 2d 656; Dierk
Lumber and Coal Co. v. Myer, 85 Myer, 85 Fed. Supp. 157.
(b) The question whether the "Quit Claim Deed" conveyed the entire mineral estate is to be determined by ascertaining the intention of the parties thereto at the time
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and under the circumstances existing when made and executed.
rrhe Respondents do not agree with Appellants' statement set forth on Page 10 of their brief that the Trial
Court was limited to the "Grazing Lease" and the "reservation of royalty" provisions in the Quit Claim Deed to
determine the intention of the parties.
This statement by the Appellants simply is not true
under the laws as set forth in this jurisdiction for the
Trial Court not only had the duty to read the entire "Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" but it had the additional
duty to take notice of all the ~surroundings and attendant
circumstances and to consider the language used in the
light of such circumstances.
The Utah Court in Read v. Forced Underfiring Corporation et al, 82 Utah 529 26 P 2d 325, the Court laid down
the following rule quoting from Page 327, as follows: "Where the language is mixed and susceptible of more
than one construction, the Court should attempt to
place itself as nearly as possible in the situation of the
parties to the contract at the time this agreement was
entered into, so that it may view the circumstances as
viewed by the parties themselves to be enabled to understand the language used in the sense with which
the parties used it. In order to accomplish this purpose it is generally proper for the Court to take notice
of the surroundings~ and attendant circumstances
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and consider the language used 1n the light of such
circumstances."
The Appellants state in Paragraph 4, Page 2 of the
brief that "In the lower Court the Respondents directed
their attack surrounding the considerations for the Deed
rather than the intent of the parties or the provisions of
the Deed." The Respondents answer this statement categorically stating that the only extrinsic evidence and all
the extrinsic evidence demonstrates beyond any question
that the parties talked about and bargained for uranium
and related minerals only, and in this connection the Court's
attention is particularly drawn to the following parts of
the said Transcript, to wit:Reporter's Transcript, page 13, lines 1 through
Reporter's Transcript, page 14, lines 12 through
Reporter's Transcript, page 15, lines 1 through
Reporter's Transcript, page 16, lines 1 through
Reporter's Transcript, page 17, lines 1 through

19
30
30
30
30

Again, the Respondents rely upon the case of Coltharp
v. Coltharp 148 Utah 389, 160 P 121 cited by Appellants
and quote from page 122 of said case:"The rule of construction applicable to instruments of
writing, including deeds, in
this juri,sdiction
is that the intention of the parties, as the same is, made
apparent from the ordinary and generally accepted
meaning of the language used by them when applied
to the subject-matter of the writing in the light of
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surrounding circumstances of the parties at the time,
controls rather than the mere technical words or
phrases. Coins v. Hogenbarth, 37 Utah 69, 106 Pac 945;
Burt v. Stringfellow 45 Utah, 207, 143 P 234; Reese
Howell Co. v. Brown, 158 Pac 684.

It is submitted that if the facts of this case are applied to the rule of law set forth above, the Respondents
must prevail.
In applying the generally accepted meaning of the
language used rather than mere technical words or phrases
in light of the circumstances at the time, it seems quite
evident that the parties intended to deal for and convey
urani urn and related minerals only.
(c) Where one of the parties to a contract, or one
directly interested in the subject matter thereof has prepared it, using ambiguous or uncertain language, such
language will be construed most strongly against the party
using it, especially when interested party is a lawyer and
prepares a contract for opposite parties who are laymen.
In the instant case the testimony clearly shows that
the negotiations took place in the middle of the night,
about the 28th day of April, 1955, (during the uranium
boom in San Juan County, Utah) ; that one of the Appellants, Ben D. Browning, who claims to have an undivided
fifty per cent interest in the mineral estate in the lands
in question dictated the "Agreement" and also dictated
the "Quit Claim Deed" to Edward M. Garrett, Appellant's
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attorney, who in turn reduced the same to writing and the
Defendant, Ben D. Browning, in so dictating said documents was acting for himself and as the attorney for the
Appellant, Max Wilcox.
Quoting from R·eporter' s Transcript, page 8, line ·6
through 21 :''MR. RUGGERI: I have alleged here some place in
the Complaint that, Oh, in Paragraph 5 which
has been denied, I allege that the Defendants Max
Wilcox and Ben Browning are, or claim to be partners
engaged in a mining partnership with respect to the
transactions and occurrence referred to in this amended complaint concerning the property herein referred
to and described in Exhibit C attached hereto and by
reference made a part hereof. Do you deny that they
are partners in this deal?
''MR. GARRETT: Yes, our claim is that they are
merely co-tenants in this property.' '
"1\'IR. RUGGERI: And it is your contention that Max
owns fifty per cent, an undivided fifty per cent?
"MR. GARRETT: That is correct.
MR. RUGGERI: And that Ben owns an undivided
per cent?
"MR. GARRETT: That is likewise correct.
(Quoting from Reporter's Transcript, page 17, lines· 13
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through 30. Mr. Ruggeri questioning
George o. Patterson answering.)

and

Mr.

"A. Well I don't know if it was anything that would
amount to anything. Asked Mr. Garrett if he'd go get
a typewriter and type it up.
"Q. Did Mr. Garrett go get his typwriter?
"A. Yes he brought his typewriter in and Mr. Browning dictated a contract to him.
"Q. And as Mr. Garrett wrote it down?"
"A. y es.
"Q. What about the deed?
"A. Well the same with the deed.
"Q. And then did you, were you the, review the writ-

ten agreement?
"A. Yes. He read it and I read it and I signed it and
when they called Mr. Wilcox over and had him sign it.
"Q. Now when you say they called Mr. Wilcox over do
you remember what was said there?

"A. I think Mr. Browning said come on, sign this
agreement, Max."
(Quoting from Reporter's Transcript, page 29, lines
20 through 23. Mr. Ruggeri is cross-examining Max
'Vilcox.)
"Q. Well you're the one that- Question: Well you're
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the one that knows. Answer: Well I tell you Ben done
most of that kind of work. I mean he was my attorney and he was there.
"A. That's right.
(Quoting from R·eporter's Transcript, page 40, lines
7 through 14. Mr. Ruggeri is cross-examining Max
Wilcox.)
"Q. And subsequent to that time all of your dealings

with Ben Browning excepting for the time that you
"W·ith Ben Browning, excepting for the time that you
delivered the stock on the 17th of July, isn't that
right?
"A. Yes.
"Q. He was actually physically present during all of

those times?
"A. Yes. Yes".
PENN STAR MINING CO. v. LYMAN et al. 64 Utah
307, 231 P. 107.
Quoting from page 110, the Utah Court said:" (4) There is still another element to which the courts,
under certain circumstances have re~ourse, in case the
language in a contract is ambiguous or uncertain, which
is that, where one of the parties, or one who is directly interested in the subject matter of the contract, has
prepared it and has used language which is ambigu-
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ous or uncertain in its meaning, the language will be
construed most strongly against the party who us~ed the
uncertain or ambiguous longuage. Although the rule is
not one of controlling influence, yet, when the evidence
is in this cas·e, shows that a lawyer, who is an interested
party, prepared the contract for the Defendants who
are laymen, the rule has sp·ecial application.
See also Hawaiian Equipment Co. Limited v. Eimco
Corporation, 15 Utah 590 207 P 2d 794 and Barnard v.
Hardy 77 Utah 218, 293 P. 12.
The Appellants rely and cite the rule of construction
that a deed should be construed most strongly against the
Grantor but they completely failed to point out that the
Appellants are responsible for the ambiguities in the Deed
they prepared or the attendant rule of construction that
iR applicable in such situations.
(d) Where the parties to a contract involving uncertainty as to its meaning have given it the same practical
construction, that construction will generally be adhered
to by the Courts in giving effect to its provisions.
The A~ppellants in Paragraph 3, page 19 of their brief
make the following Sta tement: "The findings and decree
of the lower court holding the terms of a Grazing Lease
and the terms of the royalty reservation show an interpretation and intent not to convey oil and gas are not
founded on substantial evidece or any evidence whatsoever
and must be res~erved."
1
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As stated in Respondents' Statements of Facts, the
conclusion of Appellants is not correct for the reason that
the finding of the Court is founded on substantial evidence as is apparent from reading the following facts and
applying them to the law in this jurisdiction as hereinafter
set forth. In Parag-raph 9 of Respondents' Amended Complaint they pleaded as follows: "9. That on the first day of October, 1958, the Plaintiffs G. 0. Patterson and Edna L. Patterson, husband
and wife, entered into a Grazing Lease with the Defendant, Max C. Wilcox, a copy of which said Lease
is attached hereto marked "Exhibit A" and by reference made a part hereof; that said Lease is a valid
and existing lease and is recognized as such by the
Plaintiffs."
Appellants answered the allegation as follows:"7. Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 9
of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint."
At the opening of the trial Mr. Edward M. Garrett
specifically stated that the Appellants recognized the Grazing Lease as a valid and subsisting lease when the following questions were asked and the following reply given:
(Reporter's Transcript, page 5, lines 27 through 30 and
page 6, lines 1 through 9.)
"MR. RUGGERI: Now in Paragraph 9 of the Complaint
the Defendants admit that G. 0. Patterson and Edna
Patterson entered into a Grazing Lease with Max WilSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cox and a copy of the lease is attached to it as "Exhibit
A" and by reference made a part hereof, and is a valid
and existing lease and is recognized as such by the
Plaintiffs. There was an argument or discussion that
came up, Your Honor, about this particular matten and
Mr. Patterson entered into a Grazing Lease with the
Defendant Max Wilcox and in so far as that affects
the, his right in that property we recognize that as
being a valid subsisting lease, and apparently they do
too. That's right, isn't it?
MR. GARRETT: That's correct.
It is the pos-ition of the Respondents that the Appellants, by admitting that the Respondents and the Appellants recognize the Grazing Lease as a valid and subsjsting lease the morning of the trial as stated above and by
Appellants admitting in their pleadings that it is a valid
and subsisting lease, cannot now for the first time on appeal conscientiously assert that the "Trial Court's findings
with respect to the interpretation of the parties are not
founded on substantial evidence or any evidence whatsoever and must be reversed." On the contrary, it is respectfully submitted by the Respondents that the Utah law on
this issue has been clearly stated in the Utah case of Wasatch Livestock Loan Co. v. Lewis & Sharp et al, 84 Utah
347 35 P 2d 835. Quoting from page 84 of said case, the
Supreme Court of Utah, said:
"(5) Further, the banks by their verified pleadings
having admitted the existence of Exhibit C, that it
was in full force and effect, and that title and owner-
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ship of lambs to be purchased with moneys of, the second parties to the agreement were to pass and vest
in Lewis & Sharp, with full right and power to mortgage them, must be held bound by such pleadings. It
is familiar doctrine that pleadings in a pending cause
are more than admissions; that until changed they
are conclusive on the parties pleading them and cannot be controverted by the pleader either in the Trial
Court or on Appeal. 1 Bancroft, Code Pleading, 626;
49 C. J. 122; Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., 68 Utah, 85,
249 P. 437; Heywood v. Ogden Motor Car Co., 71 Utah,
417, 266 P. 1040, 62 A.L.R. 1232."
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Woodward
v. Edmunds, 20 Utah 118, 57 P. 848, the Court states on
page 851: "Where there is any ambiguity in a contract,
the practical construction which the parties to the instrument ave given it before any controversy arose between
them should be adopted by the Court. This Court so held
in Peary v. Salt Lake City, Utah 331, 40 Pac 206."
In Trucker Sales Corporation v. Potter et al, 104 Utah
1, 137 P 2d 370, the Supreme Court of Utah on page 372
made the following statement:
"It is well settled in this State that where the parties
to a contract, with full knowledge of the terms thereof, by their actions before any controversy has arisen,
place upon it a construction which is not contrary to
the usual meaning of the language used, the Courts
will follow that construction. Fowler v. Lawson, 56
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Utah 420, 191 P. 227; Roberts v. Tuttle, 36 Utah 614;
105 P. 916; Titton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Co., 28 Utah
173, 77 P. 758, 107 Am St. Rep. 689; Snyder v. Fidelity Savings Association 23 Utah 291, 64 P. 870; Woodward v. Edmunds 20 Utah 118 57 P. 848; Peary v. Salt
Lake City 11, Utah 331, 40 P. 206."
The Grazing Lease, which the Appellant Max Wilcox
entered into on October 1, 1958, a time prior to the controversy and which all the Appellants admitted in their pleadings a.nd at the beginning of the trial to be a valid and
subsisting lease, contains language which the Respondents submits fully supports the lower Court's finding that
parties themselves have placed an interpretation of the
contract and Quit Claim Deed. The pertinent part of said
''valid and subsisting Grazing Lease" reads, as follows: "4. It is further understood and agreed that this Lease
does IJlOt include any mineral rights whatsoever and
the Lessors specifically reserve the right to occupy
so much of the surfa.ce of the demised premises as may
be necessary or convenient for any mining operations
conducted by Lessors or those acting by their authority and that no compen sa tion will be paid to Lessee
for such right."
"It is further agreed between the parties that the
l.Jessee, upon paying the rent and performing all of
the covenants and agreements herein set forth to be
performed by said Lessee, shall at the expiration of
this Lease on September 30, 1968, have the right to
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purchase the surface rights only to the real property
above described together with the Taylor Grazing Pernlits and State Leases herein referred to at a price
to be determined between the parties."
(e) Judicial Notice. 31 C.J.S. 509 defines Judicial
Notice as follows:"Judicial Notice is the cognizance of certain facts
\vhich judges and jurors may properly take and act
on without proof and because they already know them.
lVere it not for the statement of the Appellants., found
in Footnote 3, Page 16 of their brief, in which they imply
that the Court must be asked to take judicial notice of
any particular rna tter and if not asked should be limited
to matters in the record exclusively, the Res·pondents would
not have considered it necessary to mention the matter at
all but since it has been raised, the Respondents feel the
issue should be met.
31 C.J.S. 519. "Proof is not required of facts which
the Court can take judicial notice. The doctrine of
Judicial Notice isi based on convenience and expediency
and to say that a Court will take Judicial Notice of a
fact is merely another way of saying that the usual
forms of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can otherwise be acquired. J udiciaJ
kno,v·Iedge is not reached by the use of evidence; it is
a matter pertaining to the judicial function and its
exercise, like that of an admission, stipulation, or rule
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of presumption dispenses with evidence as to the point .
. . . Facts of such com.mon knowledge as to become the
subject of Judicial Notice without proof are an exception to the general rule requiring findings of fact to
be based on the evidence."
It is submitted without further argument that in this
case the following matters are the proper subject of Judicial Notice which formed a part of the circumstances existing at the time the "Quit Claim Deed" in question was
whitten by the Appellants and executed by the Respondents.
1. That all of the lands involved herein are located in
Lisbon Valley, San Juan County, State of Utah.
2. That on April 28, 1955, there was a uranium mining
boom on in San Juan County, Utah and that large deposits of uranium and fissionable source materials had
been discovered in Lisbon Valley, San Juan County,
Utah.

3. That many corporations were being formed by persons eager to make their uranium fortunes.
4. That no oil of commercial value nor any commercial
gas source had been discovered in Lisbon Valley at
that time.
5. It is equally well known and the Court found in its
memorandum decision that as a matter of comn1on
knowledge in the area of the transactions under consideration that "haulage allowance and penalties for

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
high-lime content" apply particularly to the practices
and milling process'es relative to the mining and refining of uranium and related ores and have no relation to the recovery of oil and gas.
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CON~CLUSION·S

The question here to be resolved is not whether oil and
gas have often been held to be included within the general
term "minerals" but whether the parties conveyed and intended to convey mineral rights other than uranium and
related minerals. The Supreme Court is not called upon to
determine a general definition; what is being determined
is whether the particular parties intended by particular
instruments and language and in view of particular conditions, times and circumstances to include only uranium
and associated minerals within a particular grant.
The Trial Court had under consideration before it an
"Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" which was on its face
susceptible of more than one construction but when interpreted under the applicable rules of construction, taking
into consideration all of the circumstances existing at the
time of its execution and the practical interpretation plac~ed on the documents by the parties themselves, both before
and after the commencement of the trial, and having seen
and observed the witnesses before it and being fully advised in the premises and having made its Findings of
~..,acts, all of which are fully supported by the evidence and
having properly determined the legal effect of the conveyance in question and having entered its Decree accordingly
should now be sustained by the Appellate Court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT H. RUGGERI
Moab, Utah
Attorney for Res~pondents
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